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What We Learn about Babies from Engaging with their Emotions 
Vasudevi Reddy and Colwyn Trevarthen 
 
This issue of Zero to Three focuses on 'observing' babies, to learn from 
what they do.   We have deliberately slanted the emphasis in our title to 
'engaging with' babies, because we want to show evidence that engagement is 
how we gain psychological knowledge about others, including babies, and 
that this is as true for the psychologist as it is for other folk. If we want to 
know what a baby, an adult or, indeed, any animal feels or thinks, we have to 
engage with them, allowing ourselves to feel the sympathetic response that 
the other's actions and feelings invite.  
This is a very different approach from the position of doubt and 
detachment in knowing other people’s feelings and thoughts adopted by 20th 
century psychology.  But, for a scientist studying the behaviour of any system, 
engaging and participating with it gives an insight into the meaning of the 
natural events and processes that more detached observation cannot give.  For 
understanding social phenomena, it is essential.  This was a lesson that 
anthropology learned half a century ago with Malinowski’s celebrated 
method of 'participant-observation' for the study of human communities and 
customs in unfamiliar lands.  It appears that Psychology is in a kind of denial 
about this key principle.  
Why is engagement informative?  
In 1993 the late Professor Elizabeth Bates, a pioneering researcher on early 
communication and language learning, was an invited speaker at a 
conference of the British Psychological Society in Birmingham, England.  She 
was in the audience when another invited speaker, Prof. Giannis 
Kugiumutzakis of the University of Crete, presented his findings on the 
imitation of vocal sounds and facial gestures by babies less than an hour old. 
Neonatal imitation has been one of the most controversial of all twentieth 
century findings in infant development, violating the Piagetian model that 
assumes that all social skills, including imitation, are complex intellectual 
achievements involving much trial and error in an infant's early months.  In a 
question to Prof Kugiumutzakis, Prof. Bates admitted that she had been one 
of the sceptics, disbelieving in the possibility of neonatal imitation - until she 
had tried it with a grandchild.  Experiencing the response to her attempts she 
was convinced.  Now her concern was only about what it meant, not about its 
existence.  
 This experience, that we sometimes disbelieve in things until we 
experience them ourselves, is a familiar one to all of us.  We may not have 
believed, for instance, that bringing up a child can be quite so exhausting, or 
that losing a parent can be disorienting even to adults, or that kidney stones 
can be as painful as others say they are, until we feel them ourselves.  But 
watching a baby do things is not quite the same as these experiences of 
exhaustion or despair or pain.  The baby’s actions are observable to anyone: to 
the parent, to the paediatrician, to the scientist, to the audience when they are 
presented with the scientist’s data in live form.  Why should one need to 
engage with the infant's behaviour oneself in order to be convinced about 
what one is seeing?   
There are several simple reasons for accepting that in order to ‘see’ 
psychological phenomena, or understand the processes that move 
psychological subjects, we do in fact need to engage with them as whole 
psychological beings ourselves.  First of all, the findings from Gestalt 
Psychology a century ago make it very clear that organisms perceive in 
meaningful wholes rather than in parts and clearly that which is perceived 
varies between species of organism in adaptive ways.  It must take an 
organism with feelings and thoughts to perceive feelings and thoughts in 
another.  Second, when we perceive things we also respond to them, and our 
response both legitimises that which we perceive and allows us to perceive it 
in one way rather than another, i.e., to perceive it through the medium of our 
response.  If you observe a young infant smile you observe something very 
different than if a dog or a Martian were doing the observing, and you 
respond in a different way. Third, when somebody is saying or doing 
something directly to us, we have access to information that is often 
unavailable to somebody else observing from the sidelines.  This is often a 
serious source of confusion when data on communication from experiments, 
which are inevitably selective, are presented by psychologists to their 
colleagues.  When you greet a baby and receive a smile in return, your 
experience of that smile is different from that of someone else doing the 
observing; the warmth and the compliment to you in the smile must affect 
whether and how you see it, as must any knowledge you have of the history 
of the baby’s previous interactions. 
As Prof. Bates may have discovered, in trying to get one’s newborn 
grandchild to imitate one’s protruding tongue, one is enormously sensitive to 
detail in terms of the baby’s gaze, mood and previous actions which statistical 
analyses can only attempt with difficulty.  It is not surprising that she was 
more convinced by her own single experience than by years of data reporting 
statistical frequencies of responses to ‘stimuli’. 
Emotions as the key to engagement 
We suggest that emotions are the key to psychological engagement. 
Emotions do not exist to be locked away inside individuals.  First they are 
part of an agent in her active, moving and assertive relationship with the 
world.  Second, and most important of all, emotions are intensely shared, 
because it is in the nature and function of emotions to stir up sympathetic 
responses in others.  We do not know how it happens, but we may not deny 
this sympathy.  For all who deal with infants, emotional engagements with 
them provide the most informative as well as the most helpful route to 
understanding them.  The two anecdotes described below, from the records 
following the birth of the eldest child of one of us (VR) illustrate the power 
which emotional engagements have on all involved, and the kinds of 
awareness they demand.  
Story One:  “Shamini was about 6 weeks old when her father and I tried 
the Still Face Experiment which we had heard so much about (but which I 
had neither quite believed nor really understood).  In the middle of a good 
smiley 'chat', when she was lying on the bed and I was leaning over her, I 
stopped with my face pleasant but immobile and continued looking at her.  
She did the classic thing, tried to smile a bit, then looked away, then she 
looked back at me and tried to chat and looked away again.  After maybe 30 
seconds, I couldn't stand it any longer and, smiling, leaned forward and 
hugged her, saying, "Oh you poor thing!".  At this she suddenly started 
crying.  This reaction of hers was a turning point for me.  I was shocked.  And 
very moved.  I didn't know she cared. Neither reading about the research, nor 
even subsequently watching videos of such experiments by Lynne Murray 
told me quite as much as this experience with its immediate impact in the 
knowledge of our relationship thus far”. 
Story Two:  “She was angry with me today. I was delaying giving her a 
feed because it was only two hours after the last one. But she’d been awake all 
the time so she was hungry quickly and had been wanting it for some time. 
Eventually – after being quiet for some time, then restless, and after a little 
fussing, she frowned as the culmination of the fussing, and she yelled – a 
furious sounding shout – louder volume than any other vocalisation heard 
before.  And clearly filled with rage.  Then there was no other sound, though 
the face was still angry.  I was extremely taken aback. And almost guilty.”  
(Diary at 5 weeks) 
The history of engagements and the emotional responses of shock and 
guilt clearly gave me, her mother, meaning to Shamini's acts.  Without such 
meaning laborious mechanical analyses could strive but still fail to apprehend 
the significance of the baby’s reactions.  Anyone, including a researcher, has 
to be emotionally involved in sympathy with the infant in order to fully 
understand why that emotion has come about, and what purpose or effect it 
may have in the child's experience of life.  A lot can be learned from intimate 
and 'respectful' engagement with babies' actions and feelings, and we suggest 
that this way of observing alters not only the empirical picture of what a 
particular infant at a particular time is capable of doing and feeling, but also 
the whole theoretical story about how infants develop, what they are 
motivated to experience and to be changed by.  It is a vital corrective to the 
incomplete picture one obtains by distant objective observation and by 
assuming that mental events cannot be observed directly. 
Openness to emotional engagement in studies of infants: interpretation and 
misinterpretation 
We take three examples of infant behaviour – proto-conversation, 
coyness and teasing – to make two points.  First, that these phenomena would 
simply never have been studied had it not been for psychologists’ openness to 
engaging with their infants’ emotions.  And second, that engagement allows a 
richer (and we would argue, more useful) interpretation of infant behaviour 
than does detached observation.  
The phenomenon of 'proto-conversation' with two month-olds was first 
highlighted by the linguist and anthropologist Mary Catherine Bateson in 
1971 reporting on a film of a mother with a 9-week-old from observations 
made in the linguistics laboratory at MIT. 
The phenomenon of 'talking' with a baby a few weeks old is a familiar 
one to most parents: when babies look to us and start smiling then ‘chat’ in 
extended bouts of mutual gaze, turn-taking, cooing, showing lip and tongue 
movements, waving of arms, turning wrists and extending fingers, they seem 
to experience our conversational acts as communication and must respond 
expressively.  If you allow yourself to be engaged with a two-month-old 
infant like this, especially if it is an infant you know well, and who knows 
you, it is impossible to resist becoming involved and talkative.  It is absurd 
then to doubt the communicative intent of the baby, or to argue that the 
baby’s acts merely appear to be responses to yours, that they are merely some 
kind of biologically pre-programmed reflex behaviour without appropriate 
feelings, or that what the baby is doing is just appreciating and testing the 
'mechanical' contingency of your behaviour in time, and having no 
appreciation of its affective or companionable content.   
Impossible, that is, unless you refuse to engage in the chat and insist that 
the only accurate source of data is from detachment and an unemotional 
analysis, counting responses to a controlled regime of stimuli.  Our point here 
is that emotional acts need emotional perception and one cannot do this easily 
without emotional engagement.  Refusal to accept was precisely the response 
from a male-dominated experimental developmental psychology to the claim 
that infants not yet three months old can have ‘conversations’ in which they 
take turns, show signs of pre-speech and respond to and invite others’ 
expressions of emotion.  The pre-fix ‘pseudo’ was offered instead of ‘proto’ to 
qualify these infant-mother engagements.  
The challenges to the communication claim took many forms: that the 
turn taking in the exchanges was apparent rather than real, led solely by the 
mother’s attempts to frame each infant act by her own, making them appear 
as if they were real conversational acts; that the infant could not be sensitive to 
the emotion in the mother’s acts, but was responding merely to the physical 
parameters of the expression, its intensity, volume, frequency; that the infant 
was unconcerned about the mother’s responses as responses, but merely 
interested in eliciting and maintaining a predictable level of contingency in its 
interactions with the world.  At the heart of all of these challenges was (and 
still is) a belief that infants may begin life perceiving the physical world and 
appreciating a naïve physics, but only very late in life become able to imagine 
or construct an understanding of the psychological world.  For a number of 
reasons psychologists in the 1970s and since have found it hard to believe that 
psychological states and acts were apprehendable by the unsophisticated 
organisms infants must be. 
In the next two decades responses to these challenges were put forward 
using methods that gave more information on the natural phenomena, and 
that sensitively tested them while permitting the infant subjects to be 
intimately engaged with sympathetic partners.   The reality of turn-taking 
was demonstrated by precise analysis of the infants' phases of attending, 
synchronising and predicting in relation to the adults' behaviours.  The skill 
of the infant in anticipating the course of a lively conversational game became 
more evident in research with slightly older babies enjoying routines of baby 
songs and teasing games.  A Double-Video setup was employed by Lynne 
Murray in Edinburgh, Scotland, that enabled a rigorous test of the infant's 
sensitivity to the appropriateness of the emotions and their timing in the 
adult’s expressive behaviour.   Murray's claims were challenged again in the 
90s on a technical point that was conclusively resolved in her favour by a 
replication of her findings by Jacqueline Nadel in Paris.  In fact, the claim that 
Murray's findings could not be replicated offers a perfect example of how an 
experimental failure to engage with the babies destroys the communication.  
Having failed to get communication at all, it became impossible for the 
experimenters to demonstrate the effect of replaying a video of the mother's 
expressions.  This was misread as a failure to replicate.    The motives and 
emotions of proto-conversations have recently received refined description by 
Stephen Malloch, who adapted extremely precise computer-assisted musical 
acoustic methods to show up the 'musicality' of the vocal patterns that are 
generated in mutual sensitivity by mother and child in an undisturbed and 
enjoyable chat.  (The Communicative Musicality of vocal games with infants 
is reported in Zero-to-Three, September 2002, Volume 23, No. 1). 
Another phenomenon recently identified and bound to be challenged 
both about its existence and its interpretation is that of self-conscious affective 
reactions in 2 month-olds -- expressions of coyness or shyness.  It is not 
uncommon to hear parents remarking, even about two and three month-old 
babies, that they are being shy or coy.  The behaviour itself involves a 
particular pattern: the infant smiles and as she smiles starts turning the head 
and or gaze away from the other person, and sometimes brings up her arms 
curving in front of her chest and lower face. When you see this behaviour in 
so young an infant, a variety of interpretations are possible: you could remark 
on the behaviour and see it as a kind of 'fixed action pattern' which may have 
been triggered by a specific stimulus – e.g., a too-close approach by a stranger; 
or you could, as some of parents do, see it as an emotional response of some 
kind.  How does one decide which interpretation is better?  
Observational data on the occurrence of the behaviour helps.  In one 
longitudinal study we found that the behaviour occurred in all of five infants 
studied, although with individual differences in the frequency of its 
occurrence; it occured not only to strangers, but also to the parents and even 
to the self in front of a mirror.  The likelihood of the behaviour occurring to 
strangers was greater at around four months when parents reported that it 
seemed to be inviting interaction and play.   
We found that the behaviour was more likely to be seen early, in the first 
seconds after renewal of an interaction, rather than later on.  What the baby 
does is strikingly similar to that in older children and adults, whom one 
accepts are being shy: the smiling gaze aversion, the turning of the head 
(often with quick return of head and gaze) and the arm raising are all noted 
features of embarrassed smiles, which are exhibited in a more controlled 
fashion in older children.  The pattern is interestingly (and predictably) 
similar to the stereotyped rituals of coquetry that many cultures encourage 
females to use: the fan in front of the face, the kimono sleeve in front of the 
mouth revealing smiling eyes, the face tipped down to show a sidelong 
glance, etc.  The contexts in which the babies' behaviour occurred were 
similar to the context of unexpected onset of attention in which toddlers and 
adults show embarrassment and blushing, as Charles Darwin observed.  Of 
course, there are other more sophisticated contexts that elicit embarrassment 
in older children and adults.   
We chose to interpret early coy smiles as a kind of affective self-
consciousness even in the young infant. When an infant looks at you and you 
say hello and she turns away with an intense smile and curving arms and 
then turns back to look at you, it feels like she is being coy.  Our reaction as 
participants was a crucial reason for the very investigation of these reactions.  
And it was because we experienced them as affective self-consciousness that 
the analyses comparing them structurally and functionally to those in older 
children and adults were conducted.  If it wasn’t for the developmental 
psychologist’s own emotional reactions to infant behaviour within 
engagement, most of the interesting things we know today about infants 
would not have even been recorded.   
A similar phenomenon concerns infant teasing.  In 1986 I, Vasu, 
accidentally video-taped an interaction with my nine month-old baby 
daughter in which she is offering her father a small object while he is trying to 
get her to talk for the camera.  After some occasions of him accepting the 
object, saying “Ta” (meaning, "Thank you!") dramatically and giving it back, 
she offers it again with a half smile.  He reaches out to accept it, innocently, 
and she pulls it back, with her smile broadening.  He feels tricked and 
comments on it and reaches forward with a laughing “You! Give it to me!”  A 
few seconds later she offers it again with a smaller movement of the hand, 
again with a half smile with her eyes on his face and just as he reaches, she 
withdraws it and turns as if to run away.  The family around the table laugh 
and her grandmother comments that she does tease like that.   
Not an uncommon behaviour or exchange.  But what do we make of it?  
The father felt as if he had been tricked.  I, across the room and behind the 
camera, chuckled when I saw the infant’s offer with the watchful half smile, 
even before she withdrew it.  The whole family laughed, especially after the 
infant repeated the offer and withdrawal the second time.  The interpretation 
we offered was that the infant recognised the shared understanding – that the 
holding out of an object meant that the object would then be released into the 
reaching hand (the infant had only recently started doing this and was 
evidently enjoying the whole routine) – and was playfully and intentionally 
violating that understanding in order to elicit an emotional reaction from the 
other person.   
The problem with this interpretation was that it assumed some things 
which current developmental theory was not comfortable with (although 
many developments around 9 months are now interpreted as a kind of 
'revolution' in social understanding, especially of other persons' intentions).  
The most central assumption we made was that Shamini must know 
something about her father's expectation that the object is going to be 
released; otherwise the infant would not expect an emotional reaction to the 
non-performance of that act.  This assumption was not compatible with the 
theoretical position that it is not until about 4 years of age that children even 
recognise the existence of other people’s expectations.  A simpler explanation 
was offered by mainstream theorists as an alternative to the one we offered.  It 
was that the infant may have previously received positive feedback (like 
laughter and excited chasing) to an accidental offer and withdrawal of an 
object, and had subsequently learned that this act was a good way to elicit 
that sort of reaction.  A plausible enough story.   
The crucial point is, however, what each story assumes about the 
infant’s understanding at 9 months of age, about other people’s emotional 
attitudes.  It is about what emotions an infant can sympathetically feel.  The 
story we offered assumed that the father’s emotionally charged intention or 
expectation, to-receive the object, were known by the infant.  And that it was 
this perceived psychological state and the pleasure associated with it that the 
infant was playfully teasing.  The alternative explanation assumes that the 
infant could not have been aware of the father’s intentions or expectations 
and feelings, but by simply remembering previous responses that had 
occurred 'accidentally', was trying to elicit similar behaviour.  For the 
psychologist these alternatives are academic – in the weakest sense of the 
term –- they don’t matter except as arguments which pay people’s salaries.  
For anyone dealing with infants, however, the choice of explanation matters a 
great deal.  If we assume that the infant is unaware of our expectations or 
intentions we act accordingly: we do not encourage the baby to cooperate 
with or play with our intentions and expectations, and we do not engage with 
infant’s actions that may be attempts to engage our expectations and 
intentions.  For a playful parent, who enjoys the shared emotions, this does 
not seem the right way to go. 
Engagement Creates as well as Reveals.  It Both Learns and Teaches Meaning 
Engaging with babies is crucial not only for obtaining a fuller empirical 
picture of infant development, but also for the infants’ development itself; for 
well-being, learning and teaching.  Our responses within engagement not 
only allow us to notice and to interpret specific behaviours of the infant but 
also to recognise and legitimise these behaviours.  In being able to engage and 
respond to someone we are entering a shared reality, in which the behaviour 
of each can be shared by the other.  Take for instance the following example: 
A twelve month old infant on his mother’s lap is looking out of the window 
and sees a flock of birds fly up in a rush.  He points to them excitedly, vocally 
exclaiming and with both arms extended, not turning around to look at his 
mother.  His mother looks too, and says, in a lively, confirming way, “Oh yes! 
Isn't that exciting!”.  The infant leans back into his mother’s body and 
continues to watch the birds.  Her reaction – in her voice and the movement 
of her body – affirms (to use clinical psychological terminology) – the infant’s 
excitement and legitimises his act of communication about the birds.  It 
thereby celebrates their companionship in knowledge about the world and 
the emotions it can stir up.  From this simple example, it is easy to see how an 
infant who never received any emotional reactions to his emotions may cease 
to express them or experience them in the same way.   
This same point is made by observers of good (i.e., effective) practice in 
teaching and learning.  Jerome Bruner talks of 'communities of learners' held 
together in mutual respect by the intersubjectivity of their work and 
discourse.  Barbara Rogoff calls it 'collaborative learning', and recently she 
and her colleagues have pointed out the power, in all cultures, especially the 
least technically elaborated but including our own highly industrialised and 
commercialised one in learning outside school, of 'intent participation' 
learning -- children doing meaningful things in sympathetic collaboration 
with more skilled  'teachers', while making valuable and useful products.  
Fred Erickson describes the unconsciously regulated rhythmic 'musicality' of 
classroom discourse in primary school when the teaching and learning are 
going well in the children's 'zone of proximal development'.. 
        Looking at the incidents we have described from the infant’s point of 
view, one might ask what various adult behaviours and various things they 
attend to mean to the infant.  What does someone else’s gaze mean, for 
example, and what does someone’s smiling mouth mean, and what does a 
frown mean.  The answers to these questions are complex, ranging from 
neurological bases for sympathetic recognition of actions in terms of one’s 
own action potentials to primordial meanings of particular expressive 
patterns. However, in addition to all such aspects of the activity of 'meaning', 
one thing is clear. The most powerful meaning of a smile or gaze or a frown 
emerges in the infant’s engagement with these human events, not through an 
abstracted observation nor simply as a predetermined given.  If we didn’t 
engage with infants, they wouldn’t learn very much at all about us, just as we 
wouldn’t learn very much about them.  We draw their knowledge into 
existence and they draw ours.  That is how infants, and we too, 'learn how to 
mean' from each other. 
There are two different ways of looking at learning.  One, denying the 
agency of one of the partners and observing, as it were, from outside of 
engagement, focusses on the imparting of experience by instruction, assessing 
the gains.  The second, observing and responding within engagement, 
necessitates the acknowledgement of the emotionally involved agency of both 
partners, teacher and learner, who can easily swap roles.  This second 
perspective is necessary, we argue for anything other than a sterile and 
mechanistic understanding of human mental and emotional development 
and, indeed, for promoting the development itself.  We must share and 
respond to the powerful emotions of our infant companions. 
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SIDEBAR: Cognition and Emotions in Life Experience 
Jaak Panksepp (2003), a leading expert on emotional systems in the brain and 
'affective neuroscience' has this to say about the scientific problem of relating 
rational processes to feelings:- 
"At times I do fear that cognitive-imperialism, the prevailing view in 
mind sciences, will continue to suffocate the need for focussed research 
on affective issues, and thereby, continue to delay a scientific analysis of 
such matters of foremost concern for understanding the existential inner 
qualities of human lives.    ….    That, I believe, is a hangover of 
Cartesian dualism along with the prevailing assumption that subjective 
brain-mind issues, since they cannot be directly measured, should not be 
deemed a topic of disciplined scientific discourse or inquiry." 
 
SIDEBAR:  Why We Prefer 'Sympathy' to 'Empathy' for Understanding 
Engagement 
'Empathy' is often used to designate ‘comprehending' how other persons feel, 
and, by extension, ‘kindness’, ‘helpfulness’, or ‘concern for others’.  But, the 
word is derived from a Greek word empatheia, meaning projecting feeling into 
something.  In modern Greek it signifies the ‘evil eye’!  Sympathy, in contrast, 
is derived from Greek sympatheia meaning ‘feeling with, compassion, liking’.  
It is clearly more intersubjective and ‘two-way’ than 'empathy', which, 
paradoxically, is more self-centred.   
The great 18th Century philosopher of the Scottish Enlightenment Adam 
Smith in his “Theory of Moral Sentiments” (1759) took 'sympathy' to 
designate any kind of ‘moving and feeling with’, whether motivated postively 
or negatively, and including posturing and acting in the same expressive way 
as another's body.  He said:- 
"How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some 
principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and 
render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from 
it except the pleasure of seeing it." 
"Sympathy ... may ... , without much impropriety, be made use of to 
denote our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever." 
Part I -- Of the Propriety of Action; Section I -- Of the Sense of Propriety 
Chapter I -- Of Sympathy 
Of the words available to us, sympathy clearly conveys best the core sense of 
intersubjective awareness of agency and emotion that works reciprocally 
between persons.   
The theologian and philosopher Martin Buber (1958) has urged us to 
acknowledge the fundamental difference between direct and sympathetic 'I-
thou' engagement, and a more detached observation of the other in an ‘I-It’ 
relation.  
 
SIDEBAR:  Sympathy in the Brain 
Functional imaging of activity in normal adult brains responding naturally to 
real emotive events, and/or expressing communication with emotion, is 
bringing exciting evidence for extensive systems that reflect states of mind  
between people.  Decety and Chaminade (2003) say, of their findings:- 
" Motor expression of emotion, regardless of the narrative content of the 
stories, resulted in a specific regional cerebral blood flow increase in the 
left inferior frontal gyrus. …  these results are consistent with a model of 
feeling sympathy that relies on both the shared representation and the 
affective networks." 
Most remarkable of all, the same 'mirror' systems for matching expressive 
states between people are already active in the brain of a 2-month-old baby 
who is looking at a person's face, responding sympathetically to it and ready 
to communicate feelings (Tzourio-Mazoyer, et al., 2002).  
 
 
